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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
What Should A Model Constitution Contain?
Albert L. Sturm*
I am honored by the invitation to participate in this Constitutional
Revision Symposium. I am pleased not only with the opportunity
to return to Morgantown, where I was a member of the faculty at
West Virginia University for more than fifteen years, but also to be
a participant in a program addressed to a subject of far-reaching im-
portance to West Virginians. My initial interest in the general sub-
ject of state constitutional reform, and in revision of the 1872 Con-
stitution of West Virginia particularly, dates from my early years on
the faculty of West Virginia University. In 1950, the recently
created Bureau for Government Research published my first mono-
graph on the subject; this study was revised, updated, and expanded
in 1961.' 1 return to West Virginia, therefore, with some feeling of
gratification in having played a small part in the long and arduous
process of stimulating and developing some public interest in con-
stitutional reform in West Virginia. I am glad to be here and to
participate in this Seminar.
A "Model" Constitution
The subject on which I have been asked to speak today is "What
Should a Model Constitution Contain?" Although I welcome the
opportunity to discuss this topic, I approach it with some apprehen-
sion. As John Bebout wrote in his Introduction to the latest edition
of the Model State Constitution, "Strictly speaking there can be no
such thing as a 'Model State Constitution' because there is no model
state."2 The National Municipal League published the first edition
of the Model State Constitution in 1921, and this document has gone
through six editions, the last issued in 1963 and revised in 1968.
Each edition was the product of many informed minds and resulted
from extensive deliberation and consultation of distinguished practi-
tioners and scholars in state government. Each edition of the Model
is different and reflects new views, conditions, needs, and emphases
in an ever-changing, dynamic society.
* University Research Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute.
' A. STURM, THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN WEST VIRGINIA(1950); A. STURM, MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN WEST VIRGINIA (1961).
2 BEOUT, INTRODUCTION To NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE
CONSTITUTION vii (6th rev. ed. 1968).
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Furthermore, after almost twenty years of working and writing on
state constitutional matters, I conclude that practically every careful
student and practitioner in state government is at least a potential
model builder and has his own ideas about the proper contents of a
state constitution, or at least those with which he has a working
knowledge. The fact is that the experts differ among themselves, and
the longer one labors on constitutional problems the more humble
he becomes and the less certain he is that his views should take
precedence over those of others. Actually, few persons feel qualified
to pass expert judgment on all areas of a state constitutional system.
And I am sure that I might be adjudged guilty of "carpetbaggery
in reverse" (and probably with some justification) if I should at-
tempt to express in "a few thousand well-chosen words" my personal
preferences in state constitution-making.
All careful students of state government acknowledge that there
is no such thing as an "ideal" constitution for all the states, whose
organic laws should provide for differing needs and conditions.
Nevertheless, from the lengthy experience of American states in
making and operating constitutions some consensus has developed
regarding the desirable features of these basic instruments. For
example, state government scholars would agree that these words
of Lincoln in an 1862 message to Congress are as applicable today
as in the 1860's: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present."
Growing discontent with antiquated and outmoded state con-
stitutions has been strongly expressed and reiterated since midcentury.
In 1955, the Commission on Intergovernment Relations appointed
by President Eisenhower directed the nation's attention to the "very
real and pressing need for the States to improve their constitutions."3
Increasingly, public officials and decision-makers, opinion leaders,
influential private organizations and other groups have forcefully
asserted the need for modernizing the legal foundations of state
government.'
3 COMMISION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS 38 (1955).
4 See, generally, NATIONAL MUNICnAL LEAGUE publications including
NATIONAL CIVIc REvIEw, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, STATE LEGISLATURES
PROGRESS REPORTER, and STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES; COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, STATE GOVERNMENT; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE
300K OF THE STATES; MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
(W. B. Graves ed. 1960); COMMTTEE FOR EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, MOD-
ERNIZING STATE GOVERNMENT (1967); CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, MODERNIZING STATE GOVERNMENT (1967); T. SANFORD,
STORM OVER THE STATES (1967).
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The major focus of this paper is on the proper contents of a state
constitution as viewed by authorities on the subject. But since this
is the first presentation in this Symposium, as a preface for further
discussion it appears appropriate to me to summarize the salient
characteristics of present state constitutions with particular attention
to the 1872 West Virginia document.
Nature of State Constitutionse
As fundamental laws, all American state constitutions embody the
basic principles of political democracy, such as popular sovereignty,
and especially limited government, which is implemented through the
familiar tripartite separation of powers, checks and balances, bills
of rights, and by other restrictions. In addition to providing the
basic structural framework of government, state constitutions ex-
press in varying detail both positive and limiting provisions for the
exercise of governmental powers. They define boundaries, specify
suffrage qualifications and the manner of conducting elections, and
provide methods for amendment and revision. Much verbiage in
these documents is accounted for by articles reflecting the complexity
and diversity of functional growth-local government, finance, educa-
tion, highways, corporations, welfare, agriculture, labor, and other
areas of governmental activity. Unlike the makers of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, the framers of state organic laws tradition-
ally have been much more concerned with limiting government than
with enabling and vitalizing it as an effective instrument for ac-
complishing social objectives.
Number. Until the flood of new countries achieved nationhood
during the last decade, American states had more collective ex-
perience in constitution-making than the rest of the world combined.
As of May, 1969, American states have operated under at least 138
constitutions since the Declaration of Independence.6 Louisiana
leads all other states with ten constitutions; Georgia ranks second with
eight; South Carolina has had seven, and Alabama and Florida have
had six each.' Three states have had five constitutions; nine have
6 See A. STuRm, RECENT TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REvISION
6-7 (1965); A. STuRM, MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN WEST VIRGINIA(1961).
6 Not included in this figure are Hawaii's five constitutions as a kingdom
and as a republic, and the Constitution of Puerto Rico adopted in 1952.
7 Except where otherwise identified, the sources of statistical data in this
paper are questionnaires prepared by the writer and submitted to approximately
125 correspondents in the fifty states and Puerto Rico. Data provided in
responses of the correspondents will be included in a monograph on State
Constitutional Revision to be published in 1969 by the National Municipal
League.
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had four; four have operated under three organic laws, and nine
states, including West Virginia, have had two constitutions. Twenty
states have had but one basic charter. Thus, with almost two cen-
turies of experience, the United States has been the world's principal
potential laboratory for experimentation in constitution-making.
Age. The average age of state constitutions, as of May, 1969, is
83.4 years. Oldest is the Massachusetts document dating from 1780;
the newest is the Florida Constitution, which became effective
January 7, 1969. Effective since 1872, the West Virginia Constitu-
tion is ninety-seven years old, which is seventeen years older than
the median of eighty for all the states. The West Virginia document
is one of thirty-six state constitutions now effective that antedate
1900, and one of twenty-three adopted during the thirty-five years
from the Civil War to 1900. This group of state organic laws,
probably more than any other, reflects the general distrust of gov-
ernment characteristics of the period in which they were formulated.
Length. State constitutions range in length from the estimated
253,800-word Louisiana document to Vermont's estimated 5,000-
word instrument. The Constitution of West Virginia, with an esti-
mated 22,600 words, ranks twenty-first in length among the basic
charters of the fifty states, as of January 1, 1969. Although only
a little longer than the median of estimated lengths,8 the West Vir-
ginia document is more than three times as long as the Constitution
of the United States with its twenty-five amendments.9
It is noteworthy that the six state constitutions now effective
that antedate 1850 are substantially shorter than the average.'" Com-
pared with the constitutions of the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the six oldest documents are characterized both of greater bre-
vity and flexibility. All new state organic laws adopted during the
last twenty-five years contain fewer than 20,000 words; most of them
have under 15,000.
The original constitutions of the first states were short documents
and afforded the same flexibility that distinguishes the national
Constitution. Addition of much detailed matter during the nineteenth
century reflected the popular distrust of state lawmaking bodies re-
sulting from legislative excesses and abuses. Other factors con-
8 As of January 1, 1969, the median of estimated lengths of state consti-
tutions was between those of Kentucky (21,500) and Utah (20,600).
9 The national Constitution with tweny-five amendments contains ap-
proximately 7,250 words.
1° Massachusetts (17,200), New Hampshire (12,200), Vermont (5,000),
Maine (12,950), Rhode Island (16,000), and Wisconsin (11,000).
1969]
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tributing to longer constitutions include: growth in state functions
requiring additional governmental machinery and powers, pressure
of special interests for constitutional status, public dissatisfaction
with strict judicial construction of constitutional provisions, and
faulty drafting. Furthermore, lengthening documents have bred even
more amendatory detail. Thus, long and detailed constitutions have
tended to become even longer and more detailed.
Constitutional Amendments and Reform Efforts
The accompanying table shows comparative data on proposed
amendments to all state constitutions and to the West Virginia docu-
ment, adoptions, and percentage of adoptions. Part I covers the
entire operative life of these documents up to January 1, 1969, and
Part II provides data for the nineteen-year period January 1, 1950-
January 1, 1969. Column A in both Parts I and II lists the averages
for all states for all methods;" Column B provides averages on
amendments proposed and adopted by the method of legislative
proposal; and Column C lists the figures for West Virginia, where
proposal by the legislature is the only method that has been used in
altering the Constitution.'2
These figures show that West Virginia has been less active in
proposing and adopting constitutional amendments than the average
activity for all the states, both during the entire period of effective
operation of state constitutions to January 1, 1969, and in the nine-
teen years since midcentury. Some distortion results in computing
averages because a few states propose and adopt a great many
amendments; nevertheless, West Virginia clearly ranks among those
states in which relatively little has been accomplished toward general
constitutional reform. Also of significance are the figures showing
percentage of adoptions. Again, West Virginia ranks well below the
average during both periods covered in the computation. It should
be noted that no reliable comprehensive data were available to
''As of January 1, 1969, the fifty state constitutions provided three
formal methods of proposing formal changes in their contents: (1) proposal
by the legislature, (2) by popular initiative, and (3) by constitutional con-
vention. The new Florida Constitution, which became effective January 7,
1969, is the first expressly to authorize the use of constitutional commissions,
now the fourth formal method of changing state constitutions.
12 Correspondents in the fifty states provided aggregate data on amend-
ments. For most states, the secretary of state supplied the information. Data
from a few states may not be completely accurate, but slight inaccuracies that
may exist result in no substantial distortion of the total pattern of constitutional
change by amendment.
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Amendments to State Constitutions in Effect January 1, 1969
All States and West Virginia
A B C
Average for Average for West Virginia
All States All States Legislative
All Methods Legislative Proposal
Proposal
I. Covering Entire Period of Effective Operation to January 1, 1969
1. Total proposals submitted
to voters _ 158.4* 140.3* 71
2. Total amendments adopted 97.6 90.1 39
3. Percentage of adoptions - 61.6 64.2 54.9
H1. Covering the Period, January 1, 1950-January 1, 1969
1. Total proposals submitted
to voters 70.3* 66.3* 27
2. Total amendments adopted 49.3 46.9 15
3. Percentage of adoptions - 70.1 70.7 55.5
* These figures apply to forty-nine states. Delaware voters do not act
on constitutional amendments.
permit any distinction between amendments that effect minor altera-
tions and those that apply to many sections, and even entire articles,
of the states' organic laws. Notwithstanding, they do afford a gen-
eral index of reform effort and accomplishment.
Since the West Virginia Constitution was adopted, numerous at-
tempts, both particular and general, have been made to modernize it.
These efforts until recent years have been chronicled elsewhere, and
time does not permit their detailed review here. 3 I do want to
point out, however, that as early as 1903 Governor White declared:
"Our constitution creaks at almost every joint."' 4 Two years earlier
Professor Richard Fast of West Virginia University voiced current
dissatisfaction with the 1872 document. "It has proved a most un-
satisfactory instrument of government," he wrote. "Clamor against it
from the day of its submission to the present time has never ceased,
and doubtless will not cease until a new instrument takes its place
free from the inhibitions which this one places in the way of just
'
3 See A. STuRM, MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs IN WEsT VIRGnmA(1961); C. DAvis et al, WEST VIRGINIA STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT (1963).
14J, CALLAHAN, WEST VIRGINIA I-STORY, OLD AND NEW 423 (1923).
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legislation."' 5 A number of governors have strongly advocated con-
stitutional reform, notably Governors White, Dawson, Glassock, and,
in more recent years, Patteson, Smith, and perhaps others of whose
advocacy I am not aware.
A joint committee appointed by the legislature in 1897 recom-
mended constitutional changes, a few of which were later adopted.
Some alterations resulted from the work of the constitutional com-
mission appointed by Governor Conley in 1929; only a few recom-
mendations of the most recent commission, appointed in 1957, have
found their way into the state's organic law.' 6 In 1965, in response
to strong urging by Governor Hulett C. Smith, the legislature passed
an enabling act for a constitutional convention, but this effort was
thwarted by a ruling of the supreme court of appeals that the basis
of convention representation was unconstitutional. Except for the
Modern Budget Amendment adopted last year, since 1960 the voters
of West Virginia have rejected all proposed changes other than
bonding proposals. We turn now to a brief summary of the major
common deficiencies of state constitutions, many of which are found
in the West Virginia document.
State Constitutional Weaknesses
Most state constitutions, like the basic charter of West Virginia,
were written to provide the legal foundation of government in a far
simpler society than that of today. Although most have been amend-
ed numerous times, they have failed to keep pace with the times.
Common weaknesses of state government stemming from outmoded
organic laws have been reiterated in studies made in numerous states
preparatory to basic legal reform. In my 1961 monograph on Major
Constitutional Issues in West Virginia, I listed the following typical
weaknesses, and I find little reason to change them eight years later,
except for the impact of the reapportionment revolution of the
1960's:
1. A cumbersome, unrepresentative legislature inadequately
staffed to perform the lawmaking function intelligently, with
excessively restricted powers, often unresponsive to public
needs, especially in urban areas, and subject to manipulation
by selfish interests.
'5 R. FAST & H. MAXWELL, THE HISToRY AND GOVERNMENT OF WEST
ViRGiNA 179 (1901).
'
6 For a full report of the recommendations of this Commission, see
FIFTH REPORT OF TEE WEST VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION (1963).
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2. A disintegrated and enfeebled executive with power widely
dispersed and responsibility divided among a large number
of elective officials on all levels, and an administrative
structure of great complexity featured by duplication, over-
lapping, inefficiency, and waste.
3. A diffused, complicated, and largely uncoordinated judici-
ary, often lacking in independence, with judges selected on
a political basis and frequently without professional qualifi-
cations on the lower levels.
4. Rigid restrictions on local government that seriously im-
pede home rule.
5. A long ballot listing a bewildering array of candidates and
issues and rendering the task of even the most intelligent
voter exceedingly difficult.
6. Provisions for amendment and revision so rigid, in some
constitutions, as practically to deprive the people of the op-
portunity to alter their basic law, and, in others, so lax
as to encourage too frequent changes.
7. Inclusion of a mass of detail in the constitution, blurring
the distinction between constitutional and statutory law,
and necessitating frequent amendments.
Anyone who is at all familiar with the 1872 West Virginia Con-
stitution must acknowledge the applicability of these several cate-
gories of deficiencies to the document. Other speakers in this
Symposium will discuss specific weaknesses, emphasizing those re-
lating to the three branches, local government, and finance. 7 I
shall not dwell further therefore on specific substantive defects in
these particular areas.
Considered as a whole, state constitutional weaknesses can be
classified in three broad categories: first, general documentary in-
firmities relating to style, form, and manner of presentation. Of
these, probably the greatest defect is excessive detail. Constitutional
minutiae tend to obscure the distinction between constitutional and
statutory law, deprive governmental agents of necessary flexibility,
reduce their responsiveness to public needs, and promote litigation,
17For a summary of major issues in these areas, see C. DAvis & W. Ross,
IssuEs or CoNsTrrTUoNAL REVISION IN WST VIRGINIA (1966).
1969]
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which thrives on constitutional verbosity. The West Virginia con-
stitution contains many examples of excessively detailed provisions
that are predominately statutory in character. 8 Obsolete sections
also clutter up much of the document--exemplified in provisions
relating to hereditary emoluments (III, 19), fighting of duels (IV,
10), ineligibility of salaried railroad officials for the legislature
(VI, 13), and participation in the Civil War (VIII, 20). Some
provisions have been rendered obsolete and invalid because of
changes in the national Constitution--e.g., restriction of suffrage to
males (IV, 1) and segregated public schools (XII, 8). Other docu-
mentary weaknesses include sundry inconsistencies resulting mainly
from failure to reconcile additions to the document with other con-
flicting provisions."
The second principal category comprises the many substantive
deficiencies which are exemplified in a disintegrated, enfeebled execu-
tive with widely dispersed powers and divided responsibility, in a
diffused, complicated and inadequately coordinated judiciary, and in
rigid restrictions on local home rule. Comprising the third category
of weaknesses are the omissions-those widely acknowledged in-
gredients of a modem, effective constitution, such as mandatory
provision for periodic legislative reapportionment, which is seldom
included in the older state constitutions. I turn now to recent sub-
stantive trends from which we can draw some conclusions about the
optimum contents of a state constitution.
Some Emerging Trends
As I have previously stated in this presentation, from the lengthy
experience of American states in making and operating constitutions
some consensus has developed regarding the desirable attributes of
these basic instruments of government. Although no "ideal" con-
stitution exists for all the states, and probably never will because of
great geographical, demographic, social and other differences, there
is general agreement on some basic common qualities. Here is a
representative list.2
a Especially in Article VI (Legislature), VIII (Judicial Department) and
X (Taxation and Finance); most or all parts of Article XI (Corporations),
XII (Education), and XIII (Land Titles) do not belong in a "model"
constitution.
,9 A. STuRm, MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs IN WEST VIRGINIA (1961).20 A. STuRM, RECENT TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 13-16
(1965); A. STURM, MAJOR CQNSTrUUTIONAL ISSUES IN WEST VIRGINIA 7-9
(1961),
[Vol. 71
9
Sturm: What Should a Model Constitution Contain
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969
A MODEL CONSTITUTION
1. Consistency with the Constitution of the United States. Under the
American federal system the national Constitution, laws of the
United States made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under
the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the
land. All state law, both constitutional and statutory, that is
contrary to valid national law, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court, is unenforceable and invalid. Furthermore, the
principle has been established that the national Constitution
"looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States."21
2. Provision of a sound basic framework of government with a
proper balance among the three branches. The familiar tripartite
allocation of governmental powers to legislative, executive, and
judicial departments is not required by the national Constitution,
but it has become firmly established in the American system of
government. An effective state constitution will make necessary
provision for the establishment of each branch, creating a work-
able balance among the three departments that affords safeguards
against usurpation. Moreover, viable constitutional language will
give recognition to the impossibility of any rigid separation of
powers in modem government.
3. Extension of ample power to governmental organs to discharge
their proper functions, but with appropriate controls to curb
abuse of power. Vigor and capacity for effective and responsive
action have long been subordinated by state constitution-makers
to the limitation of governmental powers. If the states are to
recapture their viability in the federal system, they must have
the necessary tools to meet the pressing problems of the latter
twentieth century and to provide solutions.
4. Inclusion of a bill of rights. The national Constitution affords
some protection to basic personal and property rights, but this is
usually minimal and is insufficient to prevent encroachment by
state authority on human liberties.
5. Provision for orderly procedures for changing the constitution
that strike a balance between extremes of rigidity and laxity.
Some state constitutions have gone unchanged for decades be-
cause of a rigid amending procedure; others, can be so readily
altered that they contain a great volume of extraneous matter.
21 McCuiloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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6. Inclusion in the document of fundamental matters, excluding sub-
stance of a temporary or detailed nature characteristic of statu-
tory law. Writing in 1819, Chief Justice Marshall gave classic
expression to the principle that a constitution should be written
in broad terms:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the sub-
divisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all
the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would prob-
ably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore,
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects be deducted from the nature of
the objects themselves.22
More than a hundred years later, Justice Cardozo stated the
matter more succinctly:
A Constitution states or ought to state not rules for the
passing hour but principles for an expanding future.2 3
A constitution containing only fundamentals is flexible because
its phraseology is necessarily general. General language is
capable of interpretation that is necessary to meet changing
conditions. Herein lies the strength of the national Constiution,
which has kept pace with the social order mainly through inter-
pretation and adaptation rather than formal amendment.
7. Use of clear, direct, simple language readily intelligible to the
average citizen, and arrangement of provisions in logical order;
conversely, avoidande of obscure and technical phraseology, in-
consistencies, obsolete provisions, and poor organization.2 4
These are widely recognized by students of state government as gen-
eral hallmarks of excellence in state constitution-making.
There is somewhat less agreement on the detailed substantive con-
tents of state organic law. However, comparative analysis of provi-
2 2 Texas, v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).213B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICLAL PROcass 24 (1921).
2 4
FELLMAN, WHAT SHOULD A STATE CONSTITUTION CONTAIN? IN MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (W. B. Graves ed. 1960); P.
KAUPER, THE STATE CONsTrrTUION: ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE (1961); NA-
TIONAL MuNmcuPAL LEAGUE, STATE, QQN TIVTONAL STUDIES PRojEcr (1960-
61).
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sions in the new state constitutions, the Model State Constitution,
and the writings of specialists in the various areas of state constitu-
tional systems indicates a substantial body of agreement. Four years
ago I attempted to synthesize the common ideas expressed in these
various sources to develop a rough composite of substantive charac-
teristics of the modem emerging state constitution. Admittedly in-
exact, nevertheless it is a convenient device for summarizing recent
trends in both theory and practice.25 Here are some of the salient
features of the major constitutional areas:
Bill of Rights: A set of guarantees of personal and political free-
dom, including both traditional substantive and procedural rights
and those that have recently emerged (such as "equal treatment" or
"antidiscrimination" guarantees, protection of persons in the course
of legislative investigations and administrative proceedings, etc.).
Suffrage and Elections: Provisions for broad participation in the
electoral process with minimum restriction on voter qualifications,
especially regarding residence requirements for participation in presi-
dential elections; state elections in the odd-numbered years, to avoid
overlapping with national elections and issues; omission of organiza-
tional and procedural details for conducting elections, which would
be determined by the legislature.
The Legislative Brench: A continuous body (preferably uni-
cameral), meeting annually as provided by law, with membership
based solely on population, elected in single-member districts for
two-year terms (if unicameral); automatic reapportionment after
each decennial census by a nonlegislative agent; flexibility in legisla-
tive organization and procedure with provision for adequate staffing;
minimum restrictions on legislative power; legislative post audit.
The Executive: Integration of executive power in a governor
elected for a four-year term and eligible for re-election (alternative:
election of the governor and lieutenant governor as a team on the
same ticket); extensive executive and administrative powers, includ-
ing power to initiate administrative reorganization subject to legisla-
tive disallowance, the item veto and with ample time to consider
legislative bills; limitation of the number of administrative depart-
ments to a maximum of 20 into which agencies would be integrated
2 5 A. STuRm, RECENT TRENDs IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 14-15
(1965); see the constitutions of Alaska, Hawaii, Michigan and Puerto Rico;
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGuE, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTrITUTIONAL REVISION
(J. P. Wheeler ed. 1961).
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on the basis of major purpose; clear provision for succession to the
governorship and reasonable procedure for determining disability;
general provision for a merit system.
The Judiciary: A unified judicial system with general provision for
two or three levels of courts and legislative power to create additional
courts as needed; selection of judges by gubernatorial appointment
(Missouri-ABA Plan) to serve during good behavior, but with
definite provision for removal; administrative direction of the courts
by the chief justice; prescription of civil and criminal jurisdiction by
the legislature; vestment in the supreme court of extensive rule-
making power covering practice, procedure, and judicial administra-
tion.
Finance: An executive budget; public expenditures only in ac-
cordance with appropriations; minimum limitations on legislative
power to tax, borrow, and spend; contraction of state debt only for
projects or objects authorized by law; general flexibility in financial
administration.
Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations: Home rule
for cities and counties with provision for optional charter systems;
express authorization for the interchange of powers and functions
among local governmental units; broad express authorization for
cooperative relationships, consolidation, and sharing and transfer of
functions among units of government.
Other State Functions: General rather than detailed substantive
provisions on governmental functions, such as education, conserva-
tion, corporations, etc.; statement of a liberal rule of judicial construc-
tion to guard against judicial findings of implied limitations.
Constitutional Change: Provision for constitutional amendment
and revision that permits the people, as well as the legislature, to
initiate changes; express authorization for legislative proposal of
amendments and constitutional conventions (and, optionally, the
constitutional initiative); automatic periodic referendum on the ques-
tion of calling a constitutional convention; mandatory submission of
all proposed constitutional changes to the electorate.
The Complete Constitution
This modern composite of substantive provisions has evolved from
long experience in state constitution-making. In summary, it guar-
antees both the traditional and recently emerged personal and prop-
[Vol. 71
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erty rights widely acknowledged to be of sufficient fundamental im-
portance to merit recognition in the basic law; it extends the elective
franchise on a wide base to all citizens capable of participating
in political processes; it provides for truly representative organs of
government fully empowered and competently staffed to perform
the functions of making, executing, and interpreting public policy
without crippling limitations; it extends to political subdivisions full
powers of local self-government consistent with statewide interests,
and authority to enter into all cooperative arrangements necessary
to solve common problems in a complex social order; it affords a
sound basis for development and use of personnel, financial, and
other resources essential for the performance of government func-
tions; and it provides procedures for constitutional change that insure
optimum stability and flexibility.
On the whole, this composite offers a positive instrument for
action and responsiveness to public needs. It eschews traditional
limitations that prompted Henry Jones Ford as early as 1908 to
refer to the "manacled state that puts a straitjacket and handcuffs
upon government."2 It represents a sharp reversal from the historic
pattern of constitution-making-away from detail and toward simpli-
fication and flexibility, yet maintaining responsibility along with
responsiveness. In short, it faces squarely the demands, complexities,
and problems of our time and looks forward to the needs of future
decades and generations.
Politics and Models
A final word of caution, however, is in order. I remind you that
the process of amending, revising, and writing a state constitution
is involved inescapably in politics. Politics implies competition
among interest groups and individuals for power to determine public
policy and to control its execution. Since a state constitution is the
legal foundation upon which the state's political structure rests,
interest groups, both within and outside government, are vitally
concerned with the contents of the document that affect them direct-
ly. Although constitution-making is lawmaking on the highest level,
it is a very practical process that is necessarily molded by tradition
and political forces and experience.
26 Tim INFLUENCE OF STATE POLITCS IN EXPANDING FEDERAL POWER, IN V
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN POLITCAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 53-63 (1909).
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Recent experience, especially in Maryland, indicates that purists
seldom win complete acceptance of their models. Compromise is an
essential attribute of democratic decision-making, including revision
of state organic laws. Other than the education afforded in the
process, writing an "ideal" constitution is of little lasting value if the
document is rejected by the electorate.
Notwithstanding these facts of political life, sustained effort
should be exerted to achieve the fundamentals of a modern, viable
instrument of government. This requires vigorous leadership and
extensive education of the electorate. Let's be realistic-constitu-
tional revision is an esoteric subject. Few voters know much about
it. Even though constitutions are important documents-living in-
struments-they do not provide very lively reading. Citizen apathy
is one of the major obstacles to be overcome. Most voters display
little interest in what seems to them to be abstract principles that
do not deal immediately with particular people and personal bread-
and-butter issues.
Political leaders have a responsibility to lead as well as to follow
their constituents. As candidate John F. Kennedy said in 1960,
It is not enough merely to represent prevailing sentiment-to
follow McKinley's practice, as described by Joe Cannon, of
'keeping his ear so close to the ground he got it full of grass-
hoppers.' 27
Few if any tasks in governmental reform are more difficult than
modernizing an existing constitutional system. But an increasing
number of states are now involved in the process of renewing the
vitality of their governments. The need for action in West Virginia
is apparent and the hour is late. I wish you well as you proceed with
this important work in the Mountain State.
2 7 Campaign Speech on the Presidency delivered to the National Press
Club, January 14, 1960. Quoted in THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY: CONCEPTS
AND CoNTRovERsY 133 (R. S. Hirschfield ed. 1968).
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